Great Recession and Not-So-Great Recovery

From the Financial Times:

This week’s IMF meetings in Washington lacked the sense of crisis which has characterised many such meetings since the crash in 2008. Although the official IMF growth forecasts were revised down slightly for 2013, mainly due to tighter fiscal policy in the US, the organisation also said that downside risks, relative to the central forecasts, had diminished since the October 2012 meetings.

These improved downside risks seem to have stemmed mainly from greater confidence in the financial system, reflecting the budget deal on the US fiscal cliff, and the actions of the ECB to reduce systemic threats to the euro. Global equity markets agree with this: they are up by 13 per cent since last autumn.

There is, however, a dangerous schism between the improvements in financial confidence and the marked lack of improvement in global GDP growth. On this latter problem, the Washington meetings were focused mainly on the weakness of the eurozone, with Christine Lagarde calling for “more investment” in Germany, greater steps towards banking union and bank recapitalisation, and ECB measures to deal with fragmentation in monetary conditions between the core and the periphery. The G20 statement refrained from setting any targets for public debt reduction, which suggests that Keynesian thinking is gaining ground in international policy circles.

The IMF and the US administration are as one on all this, but my impression is (confirmed here by Chris Giles) is that the gap between Washington and Berlin is wider than ever, especially on fiscal stimulus in Germany. There is a marked sense of frustration, but also of resignation, in Washington about the German approach. Plus ça change.

Abstracting from the details of policy in the coming months, it is important not to lose sight of the big picture for the world economy. This was well summarised in a special study on “The Great Divergence of Policies” in Chapter 1 of the IMF’s latestWorld Economic Outlook. Occasionally, a few simple graphs tell an important story:

In the graphs, the red lines represent the current cycle in the advanced economies, the blue lines represent the average of three earlier recessions (1975, 1982 and 1991), and the index numbers are centred on the year before the recessions started. An abnormally deep recession in 2008/09 has been followed by an abnormally weak recovery, so real GDP per capita is now 10 per cent below the levels indicated by previous cycles (Panel A).

Fiscal policy has been tightened everywhere to control public debt, which is much higher than “normal”, so real public spending is about 14 per cent below the cyclical norm (B). With fiscal policy tightening, the whole burden of supporting demand has fallen on monetary policy, so nominal interest rates have fallen to zero (C) and the central banks have resorted to sizeable increases in their balance sheets (D).

Questions About the Not-So-Great Recovery

This familiar story about the dramatic change in the global fiscal/monetary mix raises several questions about the Not-So-Great Recovery.

First, would the global recovery have been stronger if fiscal policy had tightened less rapidly than has actually occurred? Since the short term fiscal multiplier is almost certainly not zero, the answer to this question is clearly “yes”, but it is hard to ascribe the whole of the shortfall in GDP growth to this single factor.

If real government expenditure had performed as normal in this recovery, this would have resulted in spending being about 5 percentage points of GDP higher than it is now, so the fiscal multiplier would have needed to be about 2 in order to explain the whole of the 10 per cent growth shortfall. This seems implausibly high. Furthermore, monetary policy would have been tighter in such fiscal circumstances, and there would have been a somewhat greater (if still small) risk of fiscal crises in some economies. Therefore the Not-So-Great Recovery is not just a fiscal story.

Second, if fiscal policy is not the only factor at work, what else has been going on? Here the primary candidate is surely the collapse and subsequent malfunctioning of the banking system. Kenneth Rogoff and Carmen Reinhart, for all their arithmetical faults, warned that this would be the case, and it has been. Furthermore, the fact that the US repaired its banking system more rapidly than Europe probably explains a good part of the earlier recovery in US private spending in 2012/13. The US/Europe divergence on growth is often attributed entirely to the difference in fiscal policy between the two continents, which means that the difference in bank reform all too easily gets forgotten.

Third, if global fiscal policy is tightening and the European banking sector is still in deep trouble, can a continuation of balance sheet expansion by the central banks produce a stronger recovery? The IMF and its economists seem to be answering “yes” to this question, since they are forecasting much stronger global growth in 2014 and 2015.

But there must surely be severe doubts about this conclusion. Both the IMF and the major central banks are becoming concerned that quantitative easing is causing excessive risk taking in some financial assets, and it is doubtful whether the beneficial effect on the wider economy, via price expectations and aggregate demand, is as powerful as it was at the start.

Conclusion

The IMF’s conclusion is familiar enough: less fiscal tightening should take place in the US this year, along with longer term fiscal reform; root and branch restructuring and recapitalisation of the European banking sector is essential; and monetary accommodation is still needed because it is the only game in town. A familiar message, but this week there was little sign that any of the major policy-makers were listening.

Free to Spend, Developing Economies Recover Quicker

From the New York Times:

THIS has not been a good recovery for the wealthy countries. Growth has lagged, in part, because government spending has been far more restrained than in past recoveries from major recessions.

But developing economies have been free to increase government spending, and their economies are generally growing more rapidly than they did after past recessions.

The accompanying charts, based on data released this week by the International Monetary Fund in the semiannual World Economic Outlook, show the stark differences in performance.

At the top are charts comparing changes in real gross domestic product per capita in developing countries and advanced economies since 2008, including the fund’s forecasts for 2013 and 2014. In every year, the developed countries have lower growth. The monetary fund forecasts that this year the increase in the United States will be a paltry 1 percent, which at least is better than the forecast for the euro zone and Britain, where declines are expected.

A major reason for the slow recoveries is the absence of fiscal stimulus in much of the developed world. The middle charts show trends in government spending in advanced economies and in developing ones, comparing the trend during the current recovery to an average of the recoveries after three previous world downturns — in 1975, 1982 and 1991. In each case, the figures treat the year before the downturn as zero, and show how earlier and later years differed from that year.

In emerging markets, spending this time has been much stronger than in previous recoveries. But the opposite is true for developed countries, both as a group and for each of the four major regions — the United States, the euro zone, Britain and Japan — that are shown in separate charts.

Those changes reflect the determination to follow a path of austerity in much of the developed world. Many developing countries, having built up foreign exchange reserves in the years before the recession, do not need to follow that course.

The Great Recession brought a drop in world trade volumes that exceeded any decline since the Depression. But as the charts show, the percentage declines were a little less in developing countries than they were in developed countries. And since then, the recoveries have been far more impressive in the less developed countries.

In the euro zone, the total level of imports has still not recovered to 2007 levels, although the International Monetary Fund says it thinks that will happen in 2014. The same is true of exports from Japan, a country whose export prowess once seemed unmatched but lately has been running trade deficits.

Among the four developed regions shown, only the United States has experienced an export revival that is comparable to that of the average emerging market.

Krugman on why this global recovery is different

Krugman uses a graph from Box 1.1 of the WEO. Read the full box here.

What Next for the Eurozone? Macroeconomic Policy and the Recession

How the IMF became the friend who wants us to work less and drink more

From the Washington Post:

The International Monetary Fund has a reputation, hard earned over the decades, of being the annoying friend who is always telling you to be more responsible. Eat more vegetables! Put in more hours at the office! Do you really need that second glass of wine?

Similarly, it has historically been the IMF’s role to tell countries to behave themselves economically: Cut those deficits! Let’s see some tighter monetary policy! Do you really need such a generous public welfare system?

But something strange has changed in the world economy, which is evident in the Fund’s latest edition of the World Economic Outlook. The IMF is now among the strongest voices against excessive fiscal austerity and tight money.

The Fund is most direct in its prescriptions for Britain, which has had a stagnant economy for the past three years as deficit-reduction has gone into effect. Sure, the language is that ofinternational bureaucratese (“In the United Kingdom, where recovery is weak owing to lackluster demand, consideration should be given to greater near-term flexibility in the fiscal adjustment.”). But there is no mistaking the message: Hey, David Cameron! Slow down with the deficit reduction! 

Similarly, the Fund worries that the United States is reducing deficits too fast under the sequester spending cuts. “In the United States, the concern is that the budget sequester will lead to excessive consolidation,” says the WEO. Continue reading the Washington Post article here.

Why is the Global Recovery So Weak?

The Great Recession has been followed by the Not-So-Great Recovery. The IMF’s World Economic Outlook (WEO) shows that average incomes in advanced economies are rising, and are projected to rise, at a much slower rate than in past global recoveries. In contrast, incomes in emerging markets are growing at a much faster pace than during past recoveries—see chart 1. The WEO discusses several reasons for this divergence in fortunes. 

Box 1.1 of the WEO notes the divergence in fiscal polices. Government expenditures in advanced economies provided a stimulus at the onset of the Great Recession but withdrew it shortly thereafter. This is in contrast to what happened during past recoveries where government expenditures continued to increase. Again, in contrast, government expenditures in emerging markets have increased during this global recovery as they did in the past—see Chart 2. 

Caution about fiscal stimulus in advanced countries likely reflects the fact that they entered the Great Recession with much higher levels of debt than in the past—see Chart 3.

Box 1.1 does not get into an “an assessment of whether the different policy mix in this recession and recovery was appropriate. The response of policies may have been reasonable given the respective room available for fiscal and monetary policies in advanced economies. But there are also concerns. Even though monetary policy has been effective, policymakers had to resort to unconventional measures. Even with these measures, the zero bound on interest rates and the extent of financial disruption during the crisis have lowered the traction of monetary policy. This, together with the extent of slack in these economies, may have amplified the impact of contractionary fiscal policies. Four years into a weak recovery, policymakers may therefore need to worry about the risk of overburdening monetary policy because it is being relied on to deliver more than it has traditionally.”

Read Box 1.1 from the WEO here for the full analysis.

IMF Urges Caution on Union Policy

A WSJ blog notes: Changing euro-zone labor-market institutions has been one of the main goals of the bailout programs managed by the International Monetary Fund and euro-zone authorities over the last three years.

The thinking is: Europe’s labor markets – particularly those in the euro-zone periphery – need overhauls to allow wages to keep pace with changes in productivity and economic circumstances. This sounds like dry stuff, but it’s been one of the fund’s more controversial bailout recommendations. Making labor markets more “flexible” has in practice meant reducing the role of labor unions in wage-setting across much of southern Europe, leaving unions none-too-pleased with their more limited powers.

In a paper published on Friday, IMF economists led by Olivier Blanchard took a somewhat soul-searching look at the fund’s labor-market advice over the last three years. One interesting finding: The fund should “tread carefully” in its recommendations on collective bargaining, the paper suggests, since evidence about what kinds of bargaining arrangements work best is mixed. Read the full article here.  

How Labor Markets Can Support Workers, Economic Growth

From IMFSurvey Magazine

IMF staff have taken a fresh look at how labor markets can support workers and growth.

The unemployment rate in advanced economies exceeds 8 percent, with much higher unemployment rates among the young. A third of all young unemployed have been without work for six months or longer.

Countries face the challenge of putting these millions of people back to work and getting the young started in their careers. A new IMF Staff Discussion Note—Labor Market Policies and IMF Advice in Advanced Economies during the Great Recession—reviews IMF advice to help countries meet this challenge

The paper was written by Olivier Blanchard, the IMF’s Economic Counselor and Research Department Director, along with his colleagues Florence Jaumotte and Prakash Loungani.

Weak demand

The IMF has diagnosed high unemployment to be a result primarily of weak aggregate demand, the paper notes. Hence, it has advised that monetary and fiscal policies support demand to the extent possible, alongside generous unemployment insurance to help people cope with the human costs of being out of work.

At the onset of the crisis, the IMF called for a coordinated global fiscal stimulus, which prevented “a much worse collapse in demand than actually took place.” Along with fiscal stimulus, the paper mentions the role of policies to promote work-sharing programs, particularly in Germany, and concludes that the positive experience “has led to a reassessment of such policies at the IMF and elsewhere.”

While in a number of countries high debt has now made fiscal consolidation unavoidable, the paper recommends that such consolidation should proceed as gradually as possible and be accompanied by supportive monetary policy.

While supportive macro policies are a central part of the IMF’s advice, the paper’s focus is on the design of labor market policies and institutions to reduce average unemployment rates and boost medium-run growth.

Micro flexibility

Productivity growth—the ultimate source of gains in incomes—requires reallocation of resources from low to high productivity jobs and firms. Labor markets must permit this “micro flexibility.”

Research strongly suggests that micro flexibility is better achieved by protecting workers through unemployment insurance than employment protection. Unemployment insurance, combined with support for job searchers, makes it easier for workers to move between jobs while safeguarding their welfare.

While there is an important role for employment protection, if excessive it impedes the necessary reallocation process. The authors also recommend that dual employment protection—where high employment protection for those on permanent contracts coexists with lighter regulation on temporary contracts—should be avoided. Such a system makes the burden of adjustment fall on those on temporary contracts, who are often the young. The concentration of unemployment among the youth in many countries is a result of this duality, the authors argue, noting that the IMF has advised reducing duality in Italy, Portugal, and Spain.

Macro flexibility

Labor market policies and institutions should allow economies to adjust to macroeconomic shocks while minimizing unemployment—this is “macro flexibility.” The paper suggests that to support this flexibility, a collective bargaining structure based on a combination of national and firm-level bargaining seems attractive.

While national agreements provide coordination and help wages and prices respond to macroeconomic shocks, firm-level agreements can help wages adjust to the circumstances that companies face. The authors recognize, however, that there are also examples of efficient bargaining at the sectoral level. What seems to be important in all cases is not so much the specific arrangements as trust among social partners.

For a number of euro area countries (the so-called “periphery” or “South”), the path to recovery is through enhanced competitiveness. The two options for doing so are increasing productivity and cutting relative wages. When this needs to be done urgently, the near-term burden often falls on wage cuts because raising productivity can take a long time.

While it would be best for governments, employers, and workers to agree on wage cuts, this typically has not happened. Absent such agreements, the IMF has suggested accelerating the adjustment through various options. These include making wages reflect productivity at the firm level and, in some cases, decreasing wages in the public sector.

Not all of the burden of adjustment should be borne by the “South.” The authors note that reversing the competitiveness gap in the euro area “implies accepting higher inflation in the North of the currency union than in the South”.

The start of a discussion?

As the title of the series suggests, IMF Staff Discussion Notes are published to elicit comments and further debate on topical issues. While the paper already reflects inputs from some international institutions and trade unions, there is a need for a fuller discussion on many open issues, particularly on collective bargaining.